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Handling of Facts in Cicero’s Speech in Defence of Quintus Ligarius 
 
Abstract. After the battle of Thapsus that took place on 6 April 46 Caesar kept delaying his return to Rome for a 
long while, until 25 July—he stopped to stay on Sardinia—and this cannot be attributed fully to implementing 
measures and actions necessary in Africa since they could have been carried out by his new proconsul, C. 
Sallustius Crispus too. The triumph held owing to the victory in Africa—in which they carried around 
representations of the death of M. Petreius, M. Porcius Cato and Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica—must 
have further grated on the nerves of the aristocracy of Rome, because it was meant to symbolise Caesar’s victory 
both over Iuba and the senate. It was after that that Cicero broke his silence and delivered Pro Marcello in the 
senate, which was both oratio suasoria and gratiarum actio for the pardon granted to Marcellus, by which 
Caesar wanted to assure the senate of his benevolence and wanted to show off his power by his autocratic 
gesture. Pro Ligario delivered in 46 has been considered a classical example of deprecatio by both the antique 
and modern literature, and in historical terms it is not a less noteworthy work since from the period following the 
civil war Pro Marcello, having been delivered in early autumn of 46 in the senate, is Cicero’s first oration made 
on the Forum, that is, before the general public, in which praising Caesar’s clementia he seemingly legitimised 
dictatorship. First, we describe the historical background of the oratio and the process of the proceedings (I.); 
then, we examine the issue if the proceedings against Ligarius can be considered a real criminal trial. (II.) After 
the analysis of the genre of the speech, deprecatio (III.) we analyse the appearance of Caesar’s clementia in Pro 
Ligario. (IV.) Finally, we focus on the means of style of irony, and highlight an interesting element of the 
Caesar—Cicero relation and how the orator voices his conviction that he considers the dictator’s power and 
clementia illegitimate. (V.) 
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I  
 
Quintus Ligarius—who was born as the offspring of an insignificant Sabine gens, his brother, 
Titus fulfilled the office of quaestor urbanus around 54, his other brother, Quintus obtained 
quaestorship sometimes in the 50’s1—filled the office of legate in 50 beside Considius 
Longus propraetor in the Africa province.2 After Considius went to Rome at the end of 50 to 
run as candidate for consulate, the administration of the province was left to Ligarius, who—
as Cicero asserts—was not pleased to undertake it.3 Immediately before the outbreak of the 
civil war, in 49 the senate appointed Q. Aelius Tubero, Cicero’s remote relative, propraetor of 
Africa, who waited before taking over the province—we do not know whether his illness 
prevented him from travelling or he wanted to wait and see what direction high politics would 
take. In Africa Ligarius also took a wait-and-see attitude. That is how it happened that not 
long after the outbreak of the civil war—after the defeat by Caesar at Auximum—before the 
propraetor designated by the senate, P. Attius Varus, Pompey’s adherent, Africa’s one-time 
governor arrived in Utica,4 who arbitrarily took over the governance of the province on behalf 
of the republican side and ordered to set up two legions.5 Ligarius was compelled to 
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subordinate himself to Varus’s supremacy;6 however, both Cicero and Caesar disputed its 
validity as Varus’s procedure lacked lawful grounds.7 
Soon, in the spring of 49—the exact date is not known, it might have taken place after Cato’s 
withdrawal from Sicily, i.e., 23 April—Africa’s legitimate governor, Q. Aelius Tubero, 
together with his son appeared at Utica.8 Tubero was prohibited by Varus and Ligarius, 
exercising administration along the coast of Africa, to land and take over the province 
assigned to him by the senate as well as to take water and get his ill son to enter the province.9 
In the plea of defence Cicero shifted the responsibility for the above onto Varus.10 Regarding 
these events Caesar did not mention Ligarius’s name either, only Varus’s.11 The exact cause 
of the hostile conduct engaged by Varus and Ligarius are not known, their distrust was most 
probably due to the fact that Tubero kept delaying his journey to Africa and they suspected 
him of belonging to Caesar’s adherents. After that, Tubero joined Pompey in Greece, and took 
part in the battle at Pharsalus on his side; then, we was granted pardon by Caesar.12 
In the meantime, Caesar’s commander, Curio commanded troops to Africa in August 49, and 
after the victories over Varus and Ligarius he died in the battle against the ruler of Numida, 
Iuba. Only a few of Curio’s army, including Asinius Pollio, were able to escape to Sicily. Iuba 
considered himself absolute winner and had a part of the Roman soldiers who surrendered to 
Varus executed. Although Varus did not approve this step, he was not in the situation to 
oppose it.13 As Iuba appeared to be the republican forces’ most significant support in Africa, 
the Pompeian senate awarded him the title of king and hospitality, while the Caesarian senate 
declared him enemy (hostis populi Romani). After the battle at Pharsalus Pompey’s adherents 
gathered in Africa to continue the fight against Caesar; the office of the commander-in-chief 
was given on the grounds of Cato’s decision to Pompey’s father-in-law, the consul of the year 
52, Q. Metellus Scipio. Attius Varus, Labienus and Cato submitted themselves to Metellus 
Scipio, however, internal hostility mostly worn out the force of opposition and, to a 
considerable extent, facilitated Caesar’s victory in Africa in 46. Cato proudly took his own 
life and deprived Caesar from the opportunity of exercising power—punishment or pardon—
over him, Attius Varus and Labienus moved to Hispania, and continued the fight there up to 
45.14 
After the battle at Thapsus Ligarius was taken as captive in Hadrimentum, however, Caesar 
gave him pardon just as to Considius’s son.15 From the fact of captivity in Hadrimentum it is 
possible to draw the conclusion that Ligarius stayed there during the entire term of the war in 
Africa and did not assume any part in war actions; yet, he could not have been a really 
significant person since the author of Bellum Africanum does not mention him by name. 
Caesar’s pardon was not rare at all as the dictator gave amnesty to everybody who 
surrendered without fight in the war in Africa; only a few even of the chiefs were killed, e.g. 
Afranius and Faustus Sulla captivated during fight—whether it was done on the direct orders 
of Caesar16 or without his knowledge is disputed.17 This is fully supported by Cicero’s 
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statement when he speaks about a victory where only armed persons were killed.18 However, 
a granted pardon did not give permit to return to Italy.  
Ligarius’s relatives turned to Cicero as early as in the summer of 46 asking him to use his 
influence with Caesar to allow Ligarius to return to Italy, and in letters with highly official 
tone dated in August and September 46 respectively—which does not certify that they 
maintained any friendly relation19—the orator assured Ligarius of his help.20 It is not known 
what kind of relationship Cicero maintained with the otherwise not too significant Ligarii 
known only for their hostile emotions towards Caesar and what role Cicero’s ceaseless 
financial difficulties played in undertaking the case. It is possible that it was Brutus’s 
mediation that made Cicero undertake the case.21 On the other hand, for a long while Cicero 
did not have any direct contact with the dictator, only with his environment, e.g., with Pansa, 
Hirtius and Postumus.22 In Ligarius’s matter, together with Ligarius’s brothers he made 
efforts to get close to Caesar through mediators and disclose the matter to him.23 This was not 
an easy task because, among others, Caesar took a dislike to those who were involved in the 
war in Africa and wanted to keep them in uncertainty by delaying their return;24 Cicero 
encouraged Ligarius by asserting that his troubles would be soon solved for Caesar’s anger 
lessened from day to day.25 His next letter more resolutely voiced the hope in the opportunity 
of returning home soon26 as having undertaken the somewhat humiliating situation to ask for 
audience as a senator consularis from Caesar four years younger than him, not being above 
him at all in the hierarchy of the Republic,27 Cicero was granted personal hearing by Caesar 
where he appeared together with Ligarius’s brothers, who threw themselves to the ground at 
the dictator’s feet, and Cicero delivered a speech.28 To all that Caesar responded generously, 
which made giving amnesty unquestionable in Cicero’s eyes, however, it could not be 
considered a completed fact.29 
So, Ligarius’s case was in a fair way to get solved to satisfy everybody when in the last days 
of September 46 the son of Lucius Tubero, the former governor, Q. Aelius Tubero30 brought a 
charge against Ligarius, which he wanted to support primarily by asserting that Ligarius—and 
Varus—had not let him land in Africa, in the province assigned to them by the senate. 
Perhaps the charges included the relation maintained with Iuba as enemy and high treason 
implemented thereby. At the same time, it should be mentioned at the outset that in Pro 
Ligario delivered in October on the Forum Cicero did not touch on the legally relevant 
charges, however, by his speech—his speech made before the general public for the first time 
in the period following the civil war—he seemingly legitimised Caesar’s dictatorship.31 
The defence was provided by C. Vibius Pansa, one of Caesar’s closest men—governor of 
Bithynia and Pontus in 47 and 46, governor of Gallia Cisalpina in 45, then, on Caesar’s 
proposal, consul designatus of the year 43, together with A. Hirtius—and by Cicero. 
Regarding the progress of the case it is worth mentioning Plutarch’s account.32 Thus, Plutarch 
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presumed that the outcome of the proceedings had been determined right from the outset, 
namely, it was a decided fact for Caesar that Ligarius was guilty and would be convicted and 
it was only the power of Cicero’s eloquence that turned the flow of events. Caesar’s pardon 
produced its effect: in March 44 Ligarius was one of Caesar’s assassins,33 then he and his 
family became the victim of the proscriptiones ordered by Antonius and Octavianus.34 
It is a fact that Caesar pardoned Ligarius and let him return to Italy, however, the following 
doubts arise with regard to Plutarch’s version.35 If Caesar—as Cicero’s letter asserts—did not 
entertain hostile emotions against Ligarius, why did he allow the proceedings to take place? 
There might have been two reasons for that: he either wanted to inflict punishment on Tubero 
or wanted to provide powerful propaganda for his own clementia by forgiveness. The 
intention to convict Ligarius is highly improbable since Cicero did not put forward any new 
charges that would not have been known to him at the time of writing his letter dated late 
November, describing Caesar’s intentions.36 Furthermore, Pansa, being the dictator’s 
confidant, would not have undertaken the defence of Ligarius, if it had been decided from the 
outset that he was guilty, and Caesar would not have assigned defence to Pansa, if he had not 
wanted to give pardon to Ligarius.37 Caesar was very much aware that Ligarius did not have 
great influence among Pompey’s adherents and that the events in Africa were controlled by 
Varus, Cato, Matellus and Labieus. By that Caesar wanted to send a message to Attius Varus 
and Labienus fighting in Hispania: they had not lost all of their chances for settling the 
conflict with as little blood sacrifice as possible.38 
It seems to be more probable that Caesar decided to acquit Ligarius in order to prove his by 
then proverbial generosity again. Yet, it was just the appearance of this intention that had to 
be avoided by all means: as Caesar had no other purpose by the proceedings than have his 
clementia celebrated through acquitting Ligarius, for this reason, he put on the mask of the 
angry judge having been already convinced of Ligarius’s depravity who could be moved by 
Cicero’s eloquence only.39 Caesar as a master of political propaganda must have gladly 
grasped the opportunity offered for playing the role that his clementia was brought to the 
surface and shaped Ligarius’s fate favourably owing to the efficient oration of the counsel for 
the defence only.40 It cannot be ruled out that for Caesar—using Cicero’s role taking for his 
own goals41—the Ligarius case might have also served to enable him to convince those of his 
adherents who considered the scope of pardon granted by him excessive that both his more 
moderate and forgiving adherents and his defeated opponents agreed with the main line of his 
politics.42 
Regarding this view Wilhelm Drumann does not qualify Cicero’s role specifically, yet, 
knowing his damning judgement on the orator-statesman he could not have formed a positive 
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picture of it since elsewhere—very much in bad faith—he presents Cicero as an extremely 
vain figure who overestimates himself, is heated by the desire to be in the public eye, lacks 
clear political vision, and overtly humbles to potentes.43 The question can be estimated with 
greater subtlety from the works of Matthias Gelzer and Justinus Klass if we presume that 
Cicero, using Caesar’s propaganda, tried to realise his own program: the more supporters of 
Pompey were granted pardon, the more chances he could see for strengthening the situation of 
the optimates, which in the long run could make (could have made) it possible to restore the 
order of the state of the Republic. To this end, it was indispensable to force Caesar somehow 
to implement his announced fundamental principles.44 Handling the situation required great 
sense of tactics, seeming subordination, internal resoluteness and external flexibility from 
Cicero. Caesar’s later acts, the battle at Munda and Ides of March 44 proved that both Cicero 
and Caesar had wrongly surveyed the efforts of the other party and the political party.45 
Clementia showed towards Ligarius was addressed not only to Pompey’s adherents fighting 
against Caesar in Africa but also to those preparing for another war in Hispania, and Cicero’s 
participation in the proceedings provided sufficient publicity for the case as well as the 
appearance of objectivity manifested by Caesar.46 At the same time, Pro Ligario made it 
possible for Cicero—although it might have seemed to be shameless flattery in the eye of the 
adherents of the Republic47—to enforce his own political goals, i.e., to try to make the dictator 
committed to follow his conciliatory policy, and to find as many causes for exculpation for 
the supporters of Pompey as possible.48 Cicero, however, presumably—contrary to Gerold 
Walser’s view, who interprets the Ligarius case as demonstration of Cicero’s vanity and 
overestimation of his own role49—took part in the play directed by Caesar not because he was 
driven by political blindness and hybris, as it were believing that by his orator’s ingenuity he 
could deceit and enchant the dictator’s clear political vision. Much rather his concerns 
formulated in the letter written to Servius Sulpicius Rufus were realised:50 again he was 
compelled to take a position and as it were became extortable—if we take his promises made 
to his friends who lost favour, e.g., Ligarius seriously.51 On the other hand, if he did not want 
to get again into open hostility with Caesar, he could not refuse to legitimise his peace policy 
by taking position, which policy most probably had some attraction for Cicero too since it was 
the only thing that could bring some kind of remedy for the empire having been exhausted in 
the civil war.52 Cicero was also as much of a political realist to size up that it was impossible 
to avoid public life turning into sheer anarchy without some kind of compromise between the 
parties. Yet, he did not let Caesar use his talent as unprincipled tool: in Pro Ligario he 
ceaselessly makes an effort to certify excusable errors of Pompey’s adherents and does not 
omit to criticise the dictator’s status and the general conditions of Rome.53 
Regarding the procedure followed by Caesar, there are certain similarities with his conduct 
engaged when granting pardon to Marcellus. Caesar himself was also interested in calling 
Marcellus back from exile; on the one hand, he wanted to demonstrate his generosity again; 
and, on the other hand, he wanted to advance legitimisation of dictatorship by the fact that a 
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firm adherent of the republic such as Marcellus also returned home and acquiesced in the 
changes in political conditions, and by accepting the pardon granted to him as it were 
acknowledged it. In spite of the fact that Marcellus’s homecoming was a previously resolved 
fact, the dictator’s propaganda was meant to create the impression that Caesar bowed to the 
senate’s request only when he called the republican Marcellus back from exile. Caesar’s 
father-in-law, Piso mentioned Marcellus’s name seemingly accidentally in his speech 
delivered in the senate,54 upon which Marcellus’s cousin with identical name55 threw himself 
on the ground at Caesar’s feet to beg for pardon for his kin, then the senators also rose from 
their seat and asked Caesar to exercise mercy. The dictator, after having complained at length 
about Marcellus’s faults, seemingly utterly unexpectedly declared that he would not be averse 
to the wish of the senate. This was followed by noisy applause of the senate and Cicero’s 
speech, in which Cicero praised his human eminence. Presumably, a similar choreography can 
be observed in Ligarius’s case too. If Caesar had let Ligarius return home without special 
proceedings, he would have missed an important occasion to propagate his policy advocating 
conciliation. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to give an answer to the question whether 
Tubero had acted against Ligarius upon Caesar’s instruction or the dictator merely made use 
of the occasion being offered. 
 
II 
 
Pro Ligario raises several questions that can be answered with difficulties. Why did Cicero 
not use the obvious argument in his statement of the defence that Ligarius’s independent 
power of decision was highly restricted in Africa since governance was in the hands of Varus 
and Cato, so it was not Ligarius on whom the alliance entered into with Iuba turned? Why did 
Cicero did not strive to refute the charges made by Tubero? Why did Cicero undertake the 
case although he otherwise maintained good relations with the Tuberos and almost none with 
the Ligarii?56 Regarding the Ligarius case further questions arises: does the case under review 
constitute actual court proceedings, consequently, a real speech in court; did Caesar pass a 
judgment on Ligarius as a judge or not? Giving answer to these questions can possibly make 
further questions unimportant or no longer have a cause. 
The communis opinio gives the answer yes; and there are actually certain arguments to 
support these presumptions. Cicero calls Tubero prosecutor and Ligarius the accused, and in 
both cases he uses the proper technical term: specifically that Ligarius is an accused who 
admits his guilt, that is, an accused that each prosecutor would want,57 and that Tubero 
accuses a man who makes a confession or a man whose case—i.e. political record—is better 
than or at least the same as his.58 The charge is determined by Bauman as maiestas imminuta 
or as crimen maiestatis imminutae. The facts of the case that can be deduced from the 
described historical situation would have later belonged under lex Iulia maiestatis,59 and as 
this statute of Augustus repeats the elements of earlier legislation,60 it can be made probable 
that we can qualify Ligarius’s act treason. On the other hand, it is important to add that the 
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term maiestas does not occur at all in the entire Pro Ligario, and Cicero does not determine 
the legal nature of the charges either.61 
Also, it is against the concept of regular criminal action that the proceedings were conducted 
in the absence of the accused, i.e., Ligarius. Although Roman legal practice did not exclude 
conviction in absentia, however, the accused had to be called to appear before the law before 
commencement of the lawsuit.62 Ligarius did not get such summons, what is more, it is a 
cardinal point of his case that Caesar prohibited him to enter the territory of Italy. 
Furthermore, the lawsuit conducted due to maiestas imminuta would have belonged before the 
quaestio perpetua de maiestate set up by Sulla since Sulla’s court of justice reforms were not 
abrogated by Caesar, he changed only the lists that formed the basis of the scope of jurors and 
the scope of identity of jurors;63 this measure presumably constituted part of the reforms of 
the year 46. The proceedings, however, were conducted not before the quaestio de maiestate 
as it could be expected but before Caesar personally as judicial forum, in whose hands 
Ligarius’s fate was placed.64 
Similarly, it is against the validity of crimen maiestatis as a charge that the alliance entered 
into with Iuba, King of Numidia against Caesar would have been its implementation in 
practice.65 However, the fact of the alliance with Iuba was known to Caesar already at the 
time of granting pardon to Ligarius, after the battle at Thapsus, so a charge based thereon 
would not have brought anything new to the knowledge of the dictator.66 
The interpretation provided by Theodor Mommsen offers a possible solution for these 
difficulties; he asserts that the imperium of magistrates contains the right of the judge to pass 
a judgement in criminal proceedings too.67 Although the power of administration of justice of 
the magistrate was restricted by the legal institution of provocatio ad populum, this did not 
apply to extraordinary imperia, that is, the decemvirate of the 5th century, the second 
triumvirate and the dictatura rei publicae constituendae (he ranks both Sulla’s and Caesar’s 
dictatorship under the latter).68 This view is fundamentally shaken by Jochen Bleicken69 and 
Wolfgang Kunkel70 by stating that provocatio protected the Roman citizen from the unlawful 
coercitio (disciplinary power) of the magistrate, however, produced no influence at all on 
iudicatio (administration of criminal justice) activity. Caesar’s dictatorship does not mean 
extraordinary imperium in the sense interpreted by Theodor Mommsen since he never took 
the title dictator rei publicae constituendae (legibus scribundis).71 
Even Theodor Mommsen refers to a single example of the application of this extraordinary 
punitive power only: Ligarius’s case.72 He supports his statement by the lines of Pro Ligario 
which assert that the purpose of the prosecution is not to convict but to execute Q. Ligarius,73 
and that this could not have been carried out by anybody in this form even under Sulla, who 
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sentenced to death everybody whom he hated: since there the dictator himself gave orders to 
kill the person without anybody demanding it.74 To this Theodor Mommsen ties the following 
interpretation: the locus clearly proves that as a dictator Caesar passed a judgement over 
Ligarius as a judge and his competence was identical with that of Sulla.75 It is just the 
punctum saliens, however, that the locus does not make clear, i.e., that in a criminal case 
Caesar exercised administration of justice as a magistrate; as Cicero’s reference applies to the 
proscriptiones carried out by Sulla and does not mean to state that Sulla would have had his 
enemies executed after lawful investigation and declaring their guilt. It is public knowledge 
that Sulla was empowered by lex Valeria to have Roman citizens executed arbitrarily, without 
lawful sentence.76 So, if Caesar’s powers, by which he decided the fate of Ligarius, was 
identical with that of Sulla, then we must draw the conclusion that he obtained unlimited 
power over the losers of civil war—this seems to be supported also by the comment made by 
Cassius Dio.77  
Let us again examine the sentence of Pro Ligario considered to be of key importance by 
Theodor Mommsen, by which he wants to prove that the Ligarius case was actually court 
proceedings, specifically that the purpose of the prosecution was not to convict but to execute 
Q. Ligarius.78 It is a fact that the purpose of each formal accusation is to convict the accused, 
in the present case, however, the opponent does not claim this, much rather to kill, execute 
Ligarius without any sentence. So, just as Sulla, Caesar can proceed against his enemies as he 
pleases, he is, however, characterised not by cruelty but by clementia, and it is just exercising 
this that Tubero wants to prevent him from. The outcome of the case was probably 
determined on the grounds of a scenario worked out in advance by Caesar, showing some 
similarities with the Marcellus case, specifically—in spite of the description provided by 
Plutarch—in favour of Ligarius. Regarding Plutarch’s description it is worth quoting William 
C. McDermott’s witty formulation word for word: “Thus, a sad picture of the orator emerges, 
no longer king of the courts, but courting a king”.79 As it is made clear by the events of the 
coming years: Cicero must have felt the same and did not forgive. The proceedings learned of 
from Pro Ligario cannot be considered a real criminal action because the decision was not in 
the hands of the quaestio de maiestate but in the hands of the dictator Caesar, who did not 
have any exceptional imperium that would have entitled him to pass a judgment on criminal 
cases affecting Roman citizens as a magistrate. 
 
III 
 
The above is also supported by the form of the speech; Pro Ligario is a so-called deprecatio,80 
which is a tool of influencing arbitrary decisions of persons exercising power rather than a 
tool of the defence in court of justice as it is also noted by the author of Auctor ad 
Herennium.81 So, if Cicero chose a form for his speech that could not be used in court 
proceedings,82 then this also makes it probable that in Ligarius’s case the dictator adopted 
decision not as a magistrate acting as a judge. The orator himself declares that he turns to 
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Caesar not as a judge.83 Right at the beginning of the oration he emphasises that he considers 
his task is to raise Caesar’s compassion rather than refute the charges84 as most probably 
Pansa had already dealt with possible forms of refuting the charges.85 The purpose of 
deprecatio is not defensio facti, i.e., the defence of a given act but ignoscendi postulatio, i.e., 
praying for remission of punishment to be imposed due to a committed act or error.86 At the 
same time, it should be noted that Pro Ligario is not purely deprecatio but also a statement of 
the defence, as Cicero presents several fact-based arguments to defend Ligarius.87 The usual 
elements of deprecatio are commonplaces (loci communes) meant to evoke misericordia,88 so, 
for example, the audience’s sympathy can be aroused by referring to humanitas, fortuna, 
misericordia and rerum commutatio.89 Accordingly, deprecatio is not a genre of the court of 
justice, its scope of application is the senate and consilium—i.e., it must have been clear to the 
audience of the period that Cicero saw through the play of passing a judgment directed by 
Caesar and used it for his own benefit.90 
The logically and psychologically proper arrangement of arguments, as a matter of fact, 
constitutes a tense structure in Pro Ligario too,91 and, accordingly, the misericordia-topoi 
filled with temper, meant to affect Caesar’s clementia, were placed in the speech 
consciously.92 Already in the prooemium the orator makes it clear that he builds on Caesar’s 
misericordia,93 thus, he makes his audience aware of the fact that his purpose regarding 
Ligarius is not liberatio culpae since in his opinion his defendant has not committed crime by 
joining Pompey94 but errati venia, i.e., obtaining forgiveness for taking erroneous position.95 
In accordance with that, the orator leads the thread of Tubero being a committed adherent of 
Pompey along the speech in order to reveal the real motivation of the accusation thereby. 
The narratio, which is emphatically meant to outline the facts without emotions,96 is followed 
by the argumantatio97 that—contrary to the orator’s promise—nevertheless serves the defence 
of Ligarius: especially the paragraphs contrasting the crudelitas of the Tuberos intending to 
restrict Caesar in exercising pardon with Ligarius’s begging and tears as well as with Caesar’s 
clementia, humanitas, misericordia and lenitas.98 By that he turns Caesar’s brightly gleaming 
clementia away from the prosecutors and as it were urges him to side with his defendant,99 
and turns crudelitas that the Tuberos reproach Ligarius with around, and lets it fall back on 
the prosecutors.100 He deprives Ligarius’s case of its individuality, and contrasts the general 
miseria of the civil war with misericordia showed by Caesar, general luctus with his lenitas, 
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general crudelitas with the dictator’s clementia.101 The virtue of humanitas especially comes 
to the front for misericordia and clementia are its most beautiful forms of manifestation—
since as Quintilianus expounds, it is just this that deprecatio intends to turn the attention of 
the target audience and the addressee of the speech to.102 By underlining Caesar’s well-known 
humanitas Cicero as it were obliges the dictator to adhere to enforcing this virtue,103 and 
reminds the Tuberos of studia humanitatis, which was once not alien to them either.104 By that 
he again sets Caesar and the wing of his party urging for conciliation against the Tuberos 
desiring petty-minded revenge.105 
He makes it as it were obligatory for Caesar to keep to his principles formulated in his own 
propaganda since misericordia and lenitas are virtues frequently voiced during the civil war 
too; his humanitas can be certified by his adherents and his clementia by the whole empire. 
By all that Cicero uses the key features of Caesar’s self image as a tool for strengthening 
deprecatio.106 The following passages shed light on the purpose of these paragraphs heavily 
charged with emotions.107 Here he tries to clear Ligarius of the scelus that even after 
Pompey’s death he continued to fight against Caesar in alliance with the ruler of Numidia, 
Iuba, who was officially declared enemy by the senate by then having sided with the 
dictator.108 It was just this difference, i.e., remaining loyal to Pompey even after his death, that 
the prosecutors wanted to emphasise and thereby to take the most important argument, i.e., 
that the Tuberos also fought on the side of Pompey, away from the defence.109 In other words, 
the function of this part of the argumentatio highly charged with emotions is to win the 
dictator’s sympathy for the benefit of Ligarius and at the same time to help the orator to get 
over the pitfalls of his argumentation expounded regarding the desperate Pompeian position 
of the accused, while driving the attention of the audience and Caesar away from its logical 
pitfalls.110 
The heightening of emotions and temper reaches its climax in peroratio: Caesar can have no 
other choice than exercise the virtue of clementia.111 He repeats that his speech had no other 
goal than to produce effect on the dictator’s humanitas, clementia and misericordia, however 
within the frameworks of praeteritio he does not omit to mention that he tried to refute the 
charges against Ligarius by fact-based arguments too.112 The task of peroratio is commovere, 
the effect produced on the decision-maker’s emotions,113 and in the case of deprecatio this 
aspect is reinforced because the orator underlines several elements from Ligarius’s personality 
and deeds that were to move Caesar’s emotions. So, for example, he stresses that his deeds 
were moved not by hatred against Caesar,114 that he badly tolerates being far away from his 
brothers,115 that he stayed in Africa not upon his own resolution but by being prevented by the 
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storms of danger-fraught times of the civil war,116 and that Ligarius’s family had obtained 
several merits with regard to Caesar.117 He points out that many people from all over Italy 
appeared in mourning to beg for Ligarius.118 He refers to the pardon granted earlier by the 
dictator to others,119 Caesar’s clementia,120 misericordia,121 humanitas,122 liberalitas,123 
bonitas,124 and crowns all that by the praise that mortals having mercy on their fellow beings 
become similar to gods.125 So, the orator used all the available tools of deprecatio, not 
omitting, beside ignoscendi postulatio, defensio facti either—thereby, albeit, accepting the 
choreography set up by Caesar, using his clementia- and misericordia-propaganda for the 
benefit of his defendant.126 
 
IV 
 
In Pro Ligario both the term clementia127 and misericordia128 occur six times, and so rise to 
the most important form of conduct, feature demanded from and attributed in advance to 
Caesar. Here clementia means forgiving for error,129 which Caesar is required to do in his 
capacity as father130—stressing father’s characteristic is perhaps reference to the parens 
patriae title.131 So, the conduct arising from clementia is ignoscere,132 that is, contrary to Pro 
Marcello, here clementia is shifted from the concept of temperantia animi towards the 
meaning mercy.133 At the same time, ignoscere is suitable for expressing humanitas,134 
misericordia135 and clementia136 and thereby the border between these concepts and virtues 
fades away, and misericordia and clementia become the form of manifestation of humanitas 
Caesaris.137 To achieve this goal, i.e., the pardon to be obtained for Ligarius, the orator, 
acknowledging the dictator’s superiority, praises Caesar’s clementia and in his view he 
deserves praise primarily because after his victory he did not keep this virtue out of the reach 
of his enemies either,138 which is a sufficient cause for his former enemies evaluating and 
experiencing his victory as benefit too.139 
By praising Caesar’s clementia he introduces the part in which he speaks about his own 
former hostile emotions towards Caesar140 in order to make capital of it for his defendant: 
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Ligarius is more worthy of Caesar’s clementia than the orator himself because the former has 
never been hostile to Caesar, his unpleasant situation can be traced back to the unfortunate 
interplay of circumstances rather than to his own conviction. By that Cicero dresses his own 
Pompey supporter past in the cloak of praise of Caesar to overcome the dictator’s antipathy. 
At the same time he expresses his conviction that if the leaders of the opposition in Hispania 
accept the opportunity of peace offered by Caesar, they will not become disloyal to their 
ideas, instead, they follow the command of common sense—it is, of course, a question 
whether Cicero’s argument, to be more precise, his personality seemed to be authentic in their 
eyes since they could have possibly considered the orator a traitor.141 
As a matter of fact, it is undecided how much the praise of Caesar’s clementia came from 
Cicero’s heart as—in spite of the fact that this time to serve the peace of the community he let 
himself be used as the tool of Caesar’s propaganda—internal reservations and questioning of 
the superiority of the one-time equal rival could not have vanished without any traces from 
Cicero’s soul. Reference to Caesar as father142 and denial of the effect his own orator’s 
performance produced on Caesar’s decision143 perhaps did not lack ironic overtones.144 Cicero 
was not likely to have acknowledged the legitimacy of the situation deep inside as he did not 
give up his ideal of the republican state,145 yet, he did not openly give voice to his bitterness 
and criticism, he dressed his conviction in an ambiguous form.146 If Caesar wanted to disguise 
the trial of Ligarius as official court proceedings, then it can be considered delicate irony 
masked as flattery on Cicero’s side to refer to the dictator as pater thereby depriving him of 
his capacity as judge.147 He must have chosen deprecatio as the genre of his speech for similar 
reasons, which is obviously not a genre of court of justice, and, accordingly, neither aequitas, 
nor iustitia are mentioned in the speech. On the other hand, in spite of slight criticism and 
irony by which he addresses Caesar’s public law position, to obtain clementia and 
misericordia he uses the dictator’s propagandistic concepts for his own purposes.148 
The concept of sapientia occurs only once in the entire speech and—just as in Pro 
Marcello—is used as the synonym of political consideration and common sense.149 The 
concept of consilium also occurs only once in Pro Ligario and refers both to Caesar and 
Pompey, and in a negative sense, specifically, with respect to upsetting public order.150 It is 
due to the different objectives of the two orations that sapientia as the central concept of Pro 
Marcello is thrust into the background. An oratio every time serves utile: the primary 
objective of Pro Marcello is to outline the future of the public under the rule of Caesar as 
primus inter pares, the function of Pro Ligario is to acquit his defendant and to obtain pardon 
for him. While in Pro Marcello—as its theme covers general political issues—clementia 
Caesaris is thrust into the background, Pro Ligario deals with the fate of a single person, for 
this reason the virtue of clementia comes to the front.151 At the same time—as Pro Ligario 
serves to break the opposition in Hispania and to support Caesar’s propaganda aimed at 
conciliation to be made with his enemies fighting there—for this objective the image of 
Caesar clemens is more suitable than the image of Caesar sapiens, who is willing to let 
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bygones be bygones and forgive. Compared to Marcellus, Ligarius’s political weight is rather 
low—which cannot be necessarily said of Marcellus—so it is not specially humiliating for 
Cicero to ask for pardon for an enemy who has been much below Caesar from the outset. The 
oration made in favour of Marcellus was delivered in the senate; consequently, it was also a 
warning addressed to the senators of the need of reconciliation for the sake of common 
good—so, sapientia was the key concept that connected the audience, i.e., Caesar and the 
senators. On the contrary, Pro Ligario was delivered on the Forum and the audience was the 
populus Romanus—so, Cicero thought it was more expedient to put this key word of people’s 
party politics in the centre.152 Between the orations the political climate in Rome had 
significantly changed as a result of Caesar’s conduct, which left its mark on Cicero’s frame of 
mind sensitive of delicate vibrations.153 At the same time, Pro Ligario lacks the cautious 
optimism of Pro Marcello—in the meantime Caesar’s triumph had taken place—as if Cicero 
had given up hope that Caesar sapiens would restore res publica, and trustful tone is replaced 
by irony.154 
 
V 
 
William C. McDermott—just as Cicero himself—does not consider Pro Ligario a first-rate 
masterpiece of the orator; yet, he points out that in using irony it has an outstanding place in 
the orator’s lifework.155 It is not by chance that it is quoted by Quintilian, who based his 
textbook on rhetoric mostly on Cicero whom he enthusiastically respected,156 and from among 
Cicero’s fifty-two orations quoted by him, he refers most frequently, after Pro Cluentio 
(sixty-seven quotations) and Pro Milone (sixty-seven quotations), to Pro Ligario (fifty-three 
quotations), which is highly noteworthy as contrary to the two hundred and two paragraphs of 
Pro Cluentio and one hundred and five paragraphs of Pro Milone, Pro Ligario consists of 
merely thirty-eight paragraphs. They are followed in order of reference by Pro Murena 
(twenty-five quotations), Pro Caelio (twenty-two quotations), the second Philippica (twenty 
quotations) and the first speech against Catilina (fourteen quotations). In contrast, the fourth 
speech against Catilina, Pro rege Deiotaro, De imperio Cnaei Pompei, the ninth Philippic, 
Pro Sestio and the first Verrine oration are quoted only once in each case by Quintilian, and 
he does not refer to Pro Sulla, De provinciis consularibus and the first Philippica at all. 
Regarding Pro Ligario Quintilian calls the attention to masterly handling of the facts of the 
case and exemplary use of irony.157 Thus, Quintilian considered Pro Ligario, unique of its 
kind, a work of outstanding significance in training rhetoric.158 
In the peroratio of Pro Ligario, with huge pathos Cicero enumerates the notables of the order 
of knighthood who appeared in mourning clothes before Caesar, the people of the house of 
the Brocchi, L. Marcius, C. Caesetius and L. Corfidius.159 The latter, for that matter, could not 
be present when the speech was delivered as by then he was dead160—this error also proves 
that Cicero could not be directly acquainted with Ligarius and his family: most probably he 
had never seen the person mentioned by him but, as he was unknown, his absence could not 
                                                 
152
 Cicero, Pro Ligario 6. 37. 
153
 McDermott: op. cit. 337. 
154
 Gelzer, M.: Caesar, der Politiker und Staatsmann. Wiesbaden, 1960. 265. 
155
 McDermott: op. cit. 327. ff.; Haury, A.: L’ironie et l’humour chez Cicéron. Leiden, 1955. 185. f.; Canter, H. 
V.: Irony in the Orations of Cicero. American Journal of Philology 57. 1936. 457–464; Drumann–Groebe: op. 
cit. III. 637. 
156
 Cf. Quintilianus, Institutio oratoria 10, 1, 112.  
157
 Ibid. 4, 1, 38–39; 4, 1, 70; 9, 2, 29. 50.  
158
 McDermott: op. cit. 336. 
159
 Cicero, Pro Ligario 33. 
160
 Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 13, 44, 3. 
be noticed by many people. This pathetic enumeration of the “notables” constitutes powerful 
contrast with Caesar, L. Tubero and Pansa, and it becomes clear that Ligarius himself was the 
least important in the lawsuit. The use of pathos in this form, without cause and therefore 
turning into the opposite must have made Caesar—and deep inside certainly Cicero himself—
smile.161 
Certain sentences of the oration had a clear meaning to the audience, for example, the point 
where Cicero describes that all of them threw themselves to the ground at Caesar’s feet 
begging for pardon—including the orator himself.162 In the account written to Ligarius Cicero 
depicted that the brothers and relatives of the accused threw themselves to the ground at 
Caesar’s feet and that he spoke in accordance with the case and Ligarius’s situation.163 The 
audience might have taken Cicero’s words literally; the dictator, however, could remember 
well that Cicero had not thrown himself to the ground at his feet—to what extent Caesar 
might have taken this phrase as irony cannot be known. Calling the four years younger Caesar 
pater has again certain troublesome overtones.164 According to Dio Cassius, Caesar was 
granted the title parens patriae in 44,165 and albeit it took place two years after Pro Ligario 
was delivered, the intitulatio must have become public knowledge earlier.166 To address 
Caesar pater could not be easy for Cicero as it was him who was given the title pater patriae 
in 63 by the senate, on the initiation of Q. Lutatius Catulus, for exposing and suppressing 
Catilina’s plot; also, it is undecided how much this address sounded authentic or ironic from 
Cicero’s mouth to the ear of either the audience or Caesar.167 
Two paragraphs of the oration with clearly demonstrable ironic references and overtones 
deserve more profound analysis. In the seventh paragraph Cicero relates that after the war had 
begun and had been mostly fought, he, free from any restraint, upon his own decision, joined 
the army that took up arms against Caesar. He admits that he is saying all that before the man 
who, although being aware of this, returned him to the state before they ever met; who sent 
him a letter from Egypt telling him to stay who he was; who, although being the Roman 
people’s only imperator in the whole empire, let him be the other one (and news on that was 
brought by Pansa); who allowed him to keep the bundle of sticks decorated with laurel as long 
as he wanted; and who believed that he would save the orator indeed if he did all that without 
depriving him of any of his titles.168 At first hearing or reading, Cicero’s words seem 
flattering effusions, which Caesar was not in want of these days; yet, even if nobody else did, 
the dictator certainly discovered the irony hidden between the lines. It is worth comparing the 
content exposed here with Cicero’s letters written in the relevant period between November 
48 and August 47, primarily to Atticus. 
The first sentence of the paragraph seems to be true, however, the five elements following it 
need to be analysed more profoundly. The statement on pardon granted by Caesar is true as on 
17 December 48 Caesar gave instructions to Dolabella to write a letter to Cicero: he may 
return to Italy. This permit had significance because M. Antonius as magister equitum banned 
Cicero by name from Italy.169 When in August 47 Cicero received Caesar’s letter, he was 
unable to decide how much he could rely on what was written in it and how secure returning 
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would be.170 Only the meeting at the end of September 47 convinced Cicero that he could 
leave Brundisium and return home. In other words, only after the meeting did Caesar gave 
him back to the state. In those days Cicero wrote several letters to Caesar’s influential men, 
so, among others, to Balbus and Oppius171 and Caesar himself, and in this letter he tried to 
find excuses for his brother, Quintus for joining Pompey.172 Although on 12th August 47 
Cicero received a highly generous letter (litterae satis liberales) from Caesar, he gave an 
account of this to Terentia, yet—as it has been already mentioned—this did not dispel his 
fears.173 It is not probable that this writing referred to in a somewhat cold tone is identical 
with the letter written from Egypt that was mentioned in the letter. Thus, there is a good 
chance of presuming that the letter from Egypt is mere fiction and Caesar could be very much 
aware of that too.174 The bundle of sticks decorated with laurel as badges of power and the 
person of Pansa are referred to only once but not at the same place in the correspondence from 
this period,175 however, without the additional information provided in Pro Ligario. Most 
probably it was Caesar and Pansa who were surprised the most at the news purportedly 
brought by Pansa—and disclosed by Cicero.176 
The statement that Caesar offered Cicero imperator’s office was probably based on the 
presumption that even at their meeting in September 47 Caesar made an attempt at winning 
Cicero over to supporting his politics, Cicero, however, refused to take part actively in public 
matters.177 It was always Caesar’s more or less confessed yet never actually realised desire to 
win the support and acknowledgement of older senators in higher ranks—and Cicero had a 
special place among those whose sympathy he tried to obtain. In 60, by the mediation of 
Balbus, Caesar offered Cicero the opportunity of joining the first triumvirate,178 and in July 59 
he urged him to accept the office of legate in Gallia offered by him,179 which Cicero again 
refused.180 In March 49 Caesar as imperator sent a letter to Cicero, whom he addressed also 
by the title of imperator, in order to win his support but he did not succeed.181 All this clearly 
proves that Caesar judged Cicero’s influence in public matters and the moral weight of his 
political standpoint both more favourably and more realistically than several modern 
historians.182 
Taking all the above into consideration, we can presume that Caesar had the meeting with 
Cicero in Brundisium organised for a definite cause,183 and for such a cause that he did not 
want to disclose in a letter. With good sense William C. McDermott makes it probable that he 
wanted to entrust Cicero as magister equitum to administer Italy for the period of time while 
he was busy with the campaign in Africa; he probably offered him, owing to his activity in 
Cilicia, the opportunity to retain the triumph that Cicero had longed for,184 likewise the status 
of patrician, which he later granted to several people,185 for example, to Octavianus too,186 
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and, in his absence, the rank of princeps/primus rogatus in the senate, which Cicero most 
probably enjoyed as senator consularis in 62 and 60. If Cicero had accepted this invitation, 
beside the unus imperator he would have been alter imperator indeed.187 
Modern historiography has often tried to doubt Cicero’s practical skills in public 
administration/politics, in spite of his successful activity as proquaestor, consul in Sicily and 
proconsul in Cilicia. That Caesar had much better opinion of Cicero’s qualities is proved by 
his offers repeated several times. In 47 the opportunities offered by Caesar would have raised 
Cicero again to the forefront of politics, on the one hand, and, would have posed him a worthy 
challenge that he would have been able to meet properly, on the other—however, he was far 
from being so uninhibited, opportunist, thirsty of power and glory as his Antique and modern 
critics would like to present him. Probably listening to his inner conviction, Cicero refused the 
offered post—which he gave no account of either to Atticus or anybody else—and told his 
friends no more than Caesar had provided him with the opportunity of returning home.188 
Although in a negative context, Dio Cassius brings up that Cicero had not become magister 
equitum.189 Also, Dio Cassius puts the statement into Q. Fufius Calenus’s mouth that Cicero, 
after having been granted pardon and patrician’s rank by Caesar—the latter statement is 
obviously not true—he ungratefully assassinated him; not himself but by instigating others to 
commit the assassination.190 These two loci clearly supports that Caesar might have made an 
offer with this kind of content to Cicero in order to win his support, and, nevertheless, news 
about this must have somehow leaked out from their meeting in Brundisium.191 Thus, we have 
to declare that a part of the statements made by Cicero in the seventh paragraph is no more 
than pure fiction—but the reference to the opportunity that Caesar offered him the office of 
alter imperator can be possibly true. 
In summary it is worth paying some attention to the beginning of the peroratio of Pro 
Ligario, in which, albeit in hidden form, Cicero throws light upon the illegitimateness of 
Caesar’s power and clementia.192 In the thirty-third paragraph Cicero relates that Caesar 
declared: the opposing party—that is, Pompey’s adherents—considered everybody who was 
not with them enemy, however, he considers everybody who is not against him his own 
adherent.193 This clearly reveals the contrast between the characters of Caesar and Pompey of 
which Cicero already spoke about in Pro Marcello too, specifically that in case of Pompey’s 
victory even his own adherents were afraid of the blood bath that Pompey had announced in 
advance.194 Caesar (just because of his often praised clementia) wanted to implement quite the 
contrary: as Cicero notes after the dictator’s death, he hamstrung/obliged his enemies by the 
appearance of mercy/temperance.195 Yet, from this passage of Pro Ligario, even if nobody 
else did, Caesar could hear irony: Pompey could allow himself to make this statement because 
with proper legitimisation, on the grounds of the authorisation of the senate he fought for 
maintaining the lawful order of the state whereas Caesar, who set the aim of overthrowing the 
order of the state, that is, as an illegitimate imperator was compelled to give evidence of 
clementia. 
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